Wiper malware has evolved from a niche state-sponsored tool to a mainstream destructive capability used in cyberwarfare, APT operations, and hybrid attacks disguised as ransomware. Unlike financially motivated attacks, wipers aim for irreversible data destruction, disruption of operations, and long-term system unavailability.

This deep-dive covers architecture, TTPs, execution flow, forensic artifacts, detection strategies, and defensive engineering patterns to harden environments against modern wipers.

1. Threat Landscape & Evolution of Wipers

Early wipers (e.g., Shamoon, DarkSeoul) were monolithic binaries with a single-stage destructive payload. Modern wipers are:

• Modular / multi-stage
• Living-off-the-land (LOTL) aware
• Hybridized with ransomware to delay detection
• Designed for fast lateral propagation (AD-aware)
• Anti-forensic, often using raw disk writes to avoid logging
• Tailored for specific OSes and filesystems (NTFS, exFAT, EXT4)

Recent families show significant sophistication:

• HermeticWiper used a digitally signed driver to perform low-level disk manipulation.
• CaddyWiper avoided domain controllers to ensure continued attacker access.
• WhisperGate corrupted the MBR while posing as ransomware pre-encryption.

The shift is clear: modern wipers blend stealth, speed, and intentional anti-recovery design.

2. Wiper Malware Architecture

Modern wipers typically include the following components:

2.1 Privilege Escalation Module

• CVE-based kernel exploits
• Token impersonation (SeDebugPrivilege abuse)
• Service misconfigurations
• Driver loading (signed or sideloaded)

2.2 Recon & Target Enumeration

Targets include:

• Critical system files
• Volume shadow copies
• Backup agents & snapshot directories
• Shared network drives
• Hypervisor VMs & cluster storage

Tools commonly abused:
vssadmin, wmic, bcdedit, diskpart, fsutil, wbadmin, wmic shadowcopy delete

2.3 Destructive Engine

Techniques vary by family:

MBR / Bootloader Corruption

• Overwrite first 512 bytes
• Replace with malicious loader
• Force reboot to trigger destruction

MFT / Filesystem Destruction

• Random byte overwrite
• Targeted critical metadata sectors
• Partial-wipe to corrupt filesystem without full erase
• Unrecoverable encryption (no stored key)

File Overwrite

• Iterative enumerations of directories
• High-speed buffer writes to file handles
• Chunk-wise wipe patterns to resist recovery tools

Direct Disk Access

Examples:
CreateFileA("\\\\.\\PhysicalDrive0") → raw writes → destruction

2.4 Anti-Forensics

• Timestamp stomping
• Log deletion (EventLog/USN)
• Disabling EDR sensors
• Driver-based activity to bypass user-mode hooks

2.5 Command & Control (Optional)

Many wipers run fully offline. Some hybrid variants include C2 communication for:

• Kill switch activation
• Exfiltration prior to wipe
• Distributed trigger event

3. Kill Chain: Multi-Stage Wiper Deployment Workflow

Below is the typical operational flow observed across modern APT and pseudo-ransomware/wiper campaigns:

1. Initial Access

   - Phishing w/ malware loader

   - Exploited VPN/public RCE

   - Compromised credentials

   - Supply-chain infiltration

 

2. Establish Foothold

   - Loader deployment

   - DLL sideloading

   - Dropper → staged payload delivery

 

3. Privilege Escalation

   - Driver loading

   - Token elevation

   - Kernel exploit

 

4. Recon & Lateral Movement

   - AD query: users, DCs, GPOs

   - WMI, PowerShell Remoting

   - PsExec, RDP brute force

 

5. Pre-Destruction Actions

   - Disabling AV/EDR

   - Dismantling backups

   - Shadow copy deletion

   - Staging wiper binary

 

6. Trigger Phase

   - Timed execution (cron/task scheduler)

   - Remote C2 trigger

   - Manual activation by attacker

 

7. Destruction

   - Boot sector wipe

   - Filesystem corruption

   - File overwrite

   - Induced OS crash/reboot

 

8. Persistence (Optional)

   - Bootstrap loader loops

   - UEFI implant (rare)

   - Domain persistence via GPO backdoors

4. Forensic Artifacts & Indicators of Wiper Activity

4.1 Pre-Wipe Indicators

• Sudden surge in vssadmin and wmic shadow copy deletions
• Unexpected bcdedit modifications
• Anomalous driver loads from unusual paths
• LSASS access by unsigned binaries
• Suspicious service creations with temporary names

4.2 On-Disk Indicators

• Partial MFT corruption patterns
• Overwritten system files filled with repeated byte patterns (e.g., 0x00, 0xCC, random data)
• Missing bootloader components
• Raw disk write activity in offline analysis

4.3 Memory Artifacts

• Unlinked modules
• Threads performing raw sector writes
• Direct syscalls bypassing user-mode EDR hooks

4.4 Network Indicators

Most wipers are intentionally quiet, but hybrid strains may exhibit:

• Exfiltration to cloud storage or paste sites
• DNS tunneling prior to destructive activation

5. Blue-Team Detection Strategies

5.1 YARA Signatures

Useful for static detection in:

• EDR file scanning
• sandbox detonations
• offline forensic analysis

Can use patterns for known overwrite routines, raw disk IO, magic constants, or driver abuse.

5.2 Sigma Rules

Detect behavioral patterns such as:

• Shadow copy deletion
• Raw disk access via \\.\PhysicalDrive*
• MBR-related API calls
• Uncommon driver loads

I can generate full Sigma/YARA sets if needed.

5.3 Sysmon & EDR Behavioral Rules

Critical events:

Sysmon Event ID 1 — Process creation
✔ Detect suspicious use of:
vssadmin, wmic, diskpart, fsutil, bcdedit

Event ID 6/7 — Driver loading
✔ Flag unsigned or unrecognized kernel drivers

Event ID 11 — File creation
✔ Watch for mass file writes in short windows

Event ID 23 — FileDelete
✔ Track mass deletions in critical directories

5.4 Detection Queries

Splunk Detection Queries (SPL)

1. Suspicious Mass File Deletion

index=endpoint (process_name="cmd.exe" OR process_name="powershell.exe")

| regex command_line="(?i)(del\s+/f|remove-item|rm\s+-rf)"

| stats count by host, user, process_name, command_line

| where count > 100

2. Raw Disk Access Activity

index=endpoint process_name="*"

| regex command_line="(?i)\\\\\.\\PhysicalDrive[0-9]+"

3. Shadow Copy Destruction

index=endpoint process_name="vssadmin.exe" command_line="*delete shadows*"

4. Detection for Known Wiper Tools

index=endpoint

| regex command_line="(?i)(drivewiper|filewiper|killdisk|shamoon|acidrain)"

Microsoft Sentinel (KQL)

1. File Deletion Spikes

DeviceFileEvents

| where ActionType == "FileDeleted"

| summarize deletions=count() by DeviceName, bin(Timestamp, 1m)

| where deletions > 500

2. Raw Disk Handle Usage

DeviceProcessEvents

| where ProcessCommandLine contains @"\\.\PhysicalDrive"

3. Shadow Copy Removal

DeviceProcessEvents

| where ProcessCommandLine contains "vssadmin"

| where ProcessCommandLine contains "delete shadows"

4. Recovery Prevention Commands

DeviceProcessEvents

| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("wbadmin", "bcdedit", "disable", "shadowcopy")

Elastic (EQL/KQL)

1. File Wiping/Destructive Commands (EQL)

process where process.command_line regex ".*(cipher.exe\s+/w|format\s+|shred\s+|dd\s+if=|rm\s+-rf).*"

2. Volume Shadow Copy Deletion (KQL)

process.command_line : "*vssadmin*delete*shadows*"

3. Raw Disk Access Detection (EQL)

process where process.command_line regex ".*\\\\\\.\\PhysicalDrive[0-9]+.*"

4. High-Volume Deletes (Filebeat)

file.action:"deleted"

| stats count() by host.name

| where count > 1000

QRadar (AQL)

1. Disk Wipe Command Detection

SELECT * FROM events

WHERE UTF8(payload) ILIKE '%rm -rf%'

   OR UTF8(payload) ILIKE '%cipher /w%'

   OR UTF8(payload) ILIKE '%format %'

2. Raw Disk Access Indicators

SELECT * FROM events

WHERE UTF8(payload) ILIKE '%\\\\.\\PhysicalDrive%'

3. Shadow Copy Removal

SELECT * FROM events

WHERE UTF8(payload) ILIKE '%vssadmin%' AND UTF8(payload) ILIKE '%delete shadows%'

4. Mass File Deletion

SELECT sourceIP, COUNT(*) as deletions FROM events WHERE eventName ILIKE '%File Deleted%' GROUP BY sourceIP HAVING deletions > 500

 

6. Defensive Engineering & Architecture

6.1 Immutable & Offline Backups

• Object-level immutability (S3, GCS, MinIO)
• Air-gapped backup networks
• WORM (Write-Once-Read-Many) storage

6.2 Zero Trust + Strong Identity Controls

• No domain admin reuse
• Break-glass accounts isolated
• Mandatory PAM for privileged operations

6.3 Host Hardening

• Block unsigned driver loading
• Disable legacy protocols (SMBv1, NTLM where feasible)
• Strict EDR tamper protection
• AppLocker/WDAC allowlists

6.4 Network Segmentation

Wipers spread fast. Segment by:

• Environment (prod/dev/OT)
• Business function
• Blast-radius minimization

6.5 Detection-in-Depth

• Bootloader integrity monitoring
• Filesystem consistency checks
• Honeyfiles with high-sensitivity monitoring in critical directories

7. Incident Response Considerations

When dealing with active or suspected wiper infections:

Priority 1: Containment

• Immediately isolate suspected hosts
• Disable compromised accounts
• Block lateral movement & remote execution paths

Priority 2: Evidence Preservation

Before the wipe triggers (rare but possible):

• Memory dumps
• MFT copies
• Registry hives
• Driver & module inventories

Priority 3: Environment Recovery

• Rebuild, don’t restore, compromised systems
• Validate integrity of domain controllers
• Check for lingering persistence (GPOs, scheduled tasks, startup scripts)

Priority 4: Reverse Engineering (Optional)

• Identify wiping algorithm (overwrite pattern, sector targeting)
• Look for logic bombs or time triggers
• Map anti-analysis techniques

8. Future of Wipers: What’s Coming Next?

Emerging trends:

• UEFI/firmware-based wipers
• Cross-platform wipers targeting cloud, Linux, and containers
• AI-assisted rapid intrusion before wipe activation
• Wipers packaged inside ransomware operations to increase impact
• Attacks on industrial systems (ICS/OT) to disrupt physical infrastructure

The line between espionage, sabotage, and financial extortion continues to blur.

Conclusion

Wiper malware isn’t just a destructive nuisance — it’s a strategic, often state-backed weapon designed to cripple infrastructure and erase digital history. Understanding its architecture, kill chain, and TTPs is essential for building resilient systems.

Modern defenders need:

• behavior-based detection
• zero-trust identity
• strong segmentation
• immutable backups
• rapid IR procedures
• continuous threat intelligence

If your environment can’t detect or contain a wiper in under 5 minutes, you’re vulnerable.

Additional Resources: Sigma and Yara Rules

Sigma Rule 1 — Mass File Deletion Spike

title: Suspicious Mass File Deletion Spike

id: 8c39a434-2be7-4f80-a43e-d6c2737e7724

description: Detects abnormal high-volume file deletion activity which may indicate wiper malware.

status: experimental

author: ChatGPT

date: 2025/01/01

logsource:

  category: file_delete

  product: windows

 

detection:

  deletion_events:

    EventID: 23

  timeframe: 1m

  condition: deletion_events | count() by host > 500

 

fields:

  - FileName

  - FilePath

  - ProcessName

 

tags:

  - attack.impact

  - attack.t1485 # Data Destruction

  - attack.t1490 # Inhibit System Recovery

Sigma Rule 2 — Shadow Copy Deletion (vssadmin)

title: Shadow Copy Deletion via vssadmin

id: 1a4b9892-88b8-42c4-91ba-7eea6628ddc3

description: Detects attempts to delete shadow copies, frequently used by wiper malware to prevent recovery.

status: stable

author: ChatGPT

date: 2025/01/01

logsource:

  category: process_creation

  product: windows

 

detection:

  vss_delete:

    Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'

    CommandLine|contains:

      - 'delete'

      - 'shadows'

  condition: vss_delete

 

fields:

  - CommandLine

  - ParentImage

  - ProcessId

 

tags:

  - attack.t1490

  - attack.defense-evasion

Sigma Rule 3 — Raw Disk Access (PhysicalDrive)

title: Raw Disk Access by Userland Process

id: 0b2f73f2-07a5-4fc8-afc6-fa0fc0ccadbe

description: Detects processes accessing raw physical drives, indicative of disk wipers.

status: stable

author: ChatGPT

date: 2025/01/01

logsource:

  category: process_creation

  product: windows

 

detection:

  raw_disk_access:

    CommandLine|contains: '\\\\.\\PhysicalDrive'

  condition: raw_disk_access

 

fields:

  - CommandLine

  - Image

 

tags:

  - attack.t1561.002 # Disk Wipe

  - attack.impact

Sigma Rule 4 — Destructive Commands (cipher /w, format, shred, dd)

title: Potential Destructive File Wipe Commands

id: 6a8ea0b6-82b9-4bdf-9c2f-a3f3268a0e8b

description: Detects commands used for secure wiping or destructive disk activity.

status: experimental

author: ChatGPT

logsource:

  category: process_creation

  product: windows

 

detection:

  wipe_commands:

    CommandLine|contains:

      - 'cipher /w'

      - 'format '

      - 'shred '

      - 'dd if='

      - 'rm -rf'

  condition: wipe_commands

 

fields:

  - CommandLine

  - Image

  - ParentImage

 

tags:

  - attack.impact

  - attack.t1485

Sigma Rule 5 — Wiper Malware Known Filenames / Artifacts

title: Suspicious Known Wiper Malware Artifacts

id: 415fc612-637c-4c9d-861f-7ffe6eb427d2

description: Detects known wiper malware filenames or associated indicators.

status: experimental

author: ChatGPT

date: 2025/01/01

logsource:

  category: process_creation

  product: windows

 

detection:

  suspicious_filenames:

    Image|endswith:

      - '\killdisk.exe'

      - '\shamoon.exe'

      - '\acidwipe.exe'

      - '\notpetya.dll'

      - '\drivewipe.exe'

  condition: suspicious_filenames

 

fields:

  - Image

  - CommandLine

 

tags:

  - attack.t1485

  - attack.impact

Sigma Rule 6 — Disabling System Recovery / Backups

title: Disabling Backup and Recovery Functions id: 9b2bb642-14a5-4d43-a12b-c86d1b93dbdf description: Detects commands that disable backups or system recovery typically used by wipers. status: stable author: ChatGPT date: 2025/01/01 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: recovery_disable: CommandLine|contains: - 'wbadmin' - 'bcdedit' - 'recoveryenabled no' - 'winre' condition: recovery_disable fields: - CommandLine - Image - ParentImage tags: - attack.t1490 - attack.defense-evasion

 

YARA Rule 1 — Suspicious Raw Disk Access (PhysicalDrive)

rule Wiper_RawDisk_Access

{

    meta:

        description = "Detects binaries referencing raw disk access paths often abused by wipers"

        author = "ChatGPT"

        date = "2025-01-01"

        purpose = "defensive detection only"

 

    strings:

        $phys1 = "\\\\.\\PhysicalDrive0"

        $phys2 = "\\\\.\\PhysicalDrive" ascii wide nocase

 

    condition:

        any of ($phys*)

}

What it detects:
Binaries or scripts referencing Windows raw disk objects—common in disk-wiping tools.

YARA Rule 2 — Shadow Copy Deletion Artifacts

rule Wiper_ShadowCopy_Destruction

{

    meta:

        description = "Detects references to vssadmin shadow copy deletion commands"

        author = "ChatGPT"

        date = "2025-01-01"

 

    strings:

        $cmd1 = "vssadmin delete shadows" ascii wide nocase

        $cmd2 = "wmic shadowcopy delete" ascii wide nocase

 

    condition:

        any of ($cmd*)

}

Detects:
Attempts to disable recovery by deleting Windows shadow copies—a common wiper precursor.

YARA Rule 3 — Destructive File Wipe Commands

rule Wiper_Destructive_Command_Strings

{

    meta:

        description = "Detects destructive system commands used for wiping"

        author = "ChatGPT"

        date = "2025-01-01"

 

    strings:

        $wipe1 = "cipher /w:" ascii wide nocase

        $wipe2 = "format " ascii wide nocase

        $wipe3 = "shred -f" ascii wide nocase

        $wipe4 = "dd if=" ascii wide nocase

 

    condition:

        any of ($wipe*)

}

Detects:
Common wipe-related commands embedded inside droppers or scripts.

YARA Rule 4 — High-Risk Win32 API Usage for Wiping

rule Wiper_HighRisk_APIs

{

    meta:

        description = "Detects sensitive Win32 APIs commonly used by wipers to overwrite disks or MBR"

        author = "ChatGPT"

        date = "2025-01-01"

 

    strings:

        $api1 = "DeviceIoControl" ascii wide

        $api2 = "CreateFileA" ascii wide

        $api3 = "CreateFileW" ascii wide

        $api4 = "WriteFile" ascii wide

 

        // MBR/Partition handle targets

        $drive = "\\\\.\\C:" ascii wide

 

    condition:

        2 of ($api*) or (all of ($api1, $api4) and $drive)

}

Detects:
Unexpected combinations of APIs used for direct-disk manipulation.

YARA Rule 5 — Known Wiper Behavior Indicators (Generic Heuristic)

rule Wiper_Generic_Heuristic_Detection

{

    meta:

        description = "Generic heuristic indicators of wiper-like behavior"

        author = "ChatGPT"

        version = "1.0"

 

    strings:

        $s1 = "wipe" ascii wide nocase

        $s2 = "destroy" ascii wide nocase

        $s3 = "overwrit" ascii wide nocase

        $s4 = "killdisk" ascii wide nocase

        $s5 = "zerofill" ascii wide nocase

 

    condition:

        3 of ($s*)

}

Detects:
Common textual indicators inside destructive malware samples.

YARA Rule 6 — Indicators of Backup/Recovery Tampering

rule Wiper_Backup_Recovery_Disable

{

    meta:

        description = "Detects attempts to disable backup or system recovery from inside a binary"

        author = "ChatGPT"

 

    strings:

        $rec1 = "wbadmin" ascii wide nocase

        $rec2 = "bcdedit" ascii wide nocase

        $rec3 = "recoveryenabled" ascii wide nocase

        $rec4 = "disable" ascii wide nocase

 

    condition:

        ($rec1 or $rec2) and any of ($rec3, $rec4)

}

Detects:
Embedded commands that cripple recovery or boot configuration settings.

 

 

Phelix Oluoch

Founder, PhelixCyber

E: info@phelixcyber.com

W: PhelixCyber.com